mercredi 25 mars 2009

Dark musings, 2009-03-24



 
 

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via The Big Picture de Barry Ritholtz le 24/03/09

Steve Randy Waldman writes the blog interfluidity. His take is usually away from the mainstream, and always interesting.

His most recent discussion on Bank Nationalization is quite interesting

~~~

I often wish I were Mark Thoma. If I were Mark Thoma, I could be smart and paying attention without being bitter.

So I am not wedded to a particular plan, I think they all have good and bad points, and that (with the proper tweaks) each could work. Sure, some seem better than others, but none — to me — is so off the mark that I am filled with despair because we are following a particular course of action.

Unfortunately, I have a darker temperament, a spirit less generous and optimistic than Mark's. I am filled with despair, not because what we are doing cannot "work", but because it is too unjust. This is not my country.

The news of today is the Geithner plan. I think this plan might work very well in terms of repairing bank balance sheets.

Of course the whole notion of repairing bank balance sheet is a lie and misdirection. The balance sheets we should want to see repaired are household balance sheets. Banks have failed us profoundly. We want them reorganized, not repaired. A world in which the banks are all fixed but households are still broken is worse than what we have right now. Too-big-to-fail banks restored to health are too-big-to-fail banks restored to power. The idea that fixing legacy banks is prerequisite to fixing the broad economy is a lie perpetrated by legacy bankers.

I think that critics of the Geithner plan are missing some of its tactical brilliance. My guess is that behind the scenes, Geithner has arranged a kind of J.P. Morgan moment. You know the story. During the Panic of 1907, J.P. Morgan locked a bunch of bankers in a room and insisted they lend to stave a panic. We've already seen one twisted parody of this event, when Henry Paulson locked a bunch of bankers in a room and insisted they borrow money from the Treasury. This second one is more clever. I don't think the scandal of the Geithner plan is going to turn out to be the subsidy to well-connected investors embedded in the non-recourse loan put option. On the contrary, I think that Treasury has already lined up participants for the "Legacy Loans Public-Private Investment Fund" and persuaded them to offer prices so high that despite the put, investors will expect to take a major loss. My little conspiracy theory is that the Blackrocks and PIMCOs of the world, the asset managers who do well by "shaking hands with the government", will agree to take a hit on relatively small investments in order first to help make banks smell solvent, and then to compel and provide "good optics" for a maximal transfer from government to key financial institutions.

Consider a hypothetical asset manager, PIMROCK. PIMROCK reviews a pool of loans held by the bank J.P. Citi of America, and its analysts determine they are worth 30¢ of par value. The bank holds them at 80¢ on its book. PIMROCK agrees to put down $10B to purchase loans from the pool at 82¢ thrilling stock markets everywhere. It was all just a bad dream!

Under Geithner's plan, PIMROCK's $10B permits a $10B equity investment from the Treasury. Then the FDIC levers the whole thing up, providing $6 of debt for every one dollar of equity. So, $140B of bad loans are lifted from J.P. Citi of America, nearly $90B of which is sheer overpayment to the bank.

Of course, as cash flows evolve, PIMROCK's $10B is wiped out entirely, as is the Treasury's investment. The FDIC gets repaid in a bunch of securities worth about $50B, taking a $70B loss. But, as Calculated Risk, likes to say "Hoocoodanode?" These were real market prices, Geithner or his successor will argue. Our private partners lost everything. There was no subsidy here.

Meanwhile, taxpayers will be out around $80B.

Why would PIMROCK go along with this? Because they feel it is their patriotic duty to work with the government for the good of the financial system, even if that involves accepting some sacrifices. And because they hold $100B in J.P. Citi of America bonds, and they've received assurances that if we can get the nation out of the financial pickle it's in, there will be no haircuts on those bonds. "Shaking hands with the government" means that nothing ever has to be put in writing.

Welcome to America, 2009. Change we can believe in.

The scenario I've presented is a variation on this by Karl Denninger (ht Tyler Cowen).

I liked this post today by Matt Yglesias:

My biggest concern about the PPIP approach to the banking system is that even if it works, what it does essentially is return us to the pre-crisis status quo — banks that are so large that they're too politically powerful to regulate effective and too systemically important to be allowed to fail. That's a recipe for dishonest transactions that produce short-term profits at the cost of blowups. One appealing element of nationalization is that it can easily be made to end in a world in which there is no institution named "Bank of America" or "Citi" and no such gigantic institution.

On the bright side, I'm thankful that we have people like Paul Krugman, Simon Johnson, and Willem Buiter, who fight the good fight while being too eminent to ignore.

On the dark side, try here, here, and here.


 
 

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mardi 24 mars 2009

Guest Post: Hedge Fund Socialism?



 
 

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via naked capitalism de Leo Kolivakis le 24/03/09

Submitted by Leo Kolivakis, publisher of Pension Pulse.


Wall Street got the news it wanted on the economy's biggest problems -- banks and housing -- and celebrated by hurtling the Dow Jones industrials up nearly 500 points:
Investors added rocket fuel Monday to a two-week-old advance, cheering the government's plan to help banks remove bad assets from their books and also welcoming a report showing a surprising increase in home sales. Major stock indicators surged about 7 percent, including the Dow, which had its biggest percentage gain since October.

Analysts who have seen the market's recent false starts are still hesitant to say Wall Street is indeed recovering from the collapse that began last fall. But the day's banking and housing news bolstered the growing belief that the economy is starting to heal, and that is what had investors buying.

"It's just hard to argue that there isn't an improvement in economic activity on the horizon," said Jim Dunigan, executive vice president at PNC Wealth Management.

The market began turning around two weeks ago on news that Citigroup Inc. was operating at a profit in January and February. A spate of more upbeat economic reports helped the market build on its gains, although the rally stalled last Thursday and Friday.

Analysts said they saw more fundamental strength in Monday's buying than they saw at the start of the rally. Dave Rovelli, managing director of trading at brokerage Canaccord Adams, said there appeared to be less short covering, which occurs when traders are forced to buy to cover misplaced bets that stocks would fall. Short covering contributed to the market's surge after the Citigroup news.

"There is definitely new buying," he said. Rovelli also said the approaching end of the quarter can make money managers eager to buy into a market to make the statements they send to clients look stronger.

Stocks shot higher at the opening and kept going. The Treasury Department said its bad asset cleanup program would tap money from the government's $700 billion financial rescue fund and involve help from the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and the participation of private investors.

The market had been waiting for weeks to hear details of the government's plan for helping banks get rid of bad assets. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announced an outline of the program last month but provided few details then about how it would work, leading to a stock plunge that sliced 380 points from the Dow.

But while analysts were pleased with the market's performance Monday, they were also still cautious; Wall Street more than gave back its big yearend rally and continued falling during January and February.

Subodh Kumar, an independent investment strategist in Toronto, said the Fed's announcement that it would buy government debt and the details on plans to help banks are giving traders hope for recovery.

"The market is shedding some of its excess pessimism. That doesn't mean the market goes straight up," he said.

The National Association of Realtors' existing home sales report was overwhelmingly positive for investors although it showed a decline in home prices in February.

Investors are embracing any sign that a glut in homes for sale may be easing. Monday's data followed a dose of good housing news last week as housing starts for February came in much better than expected.

The Dow rose 497.48, or 6.8 percent, to 7,775.86, its highest finish since Feb. 13. It was the biggest point gain for the blue chips since Nov. 13 when they rose 552 points and the biggest percentage gain since Oct. 28, when they rose 10.9 percent. It was the fifth-biggest point gain in the Dow's history.

Broader stock indicators also surged. The Standard & Poor's 500 index rose 54.38, or 7.1 percent, to 822.92, crossing the psychological milepost of 800. The Nasdaq composite index rose 98.50, or 6.8 percent, to 1,555.77.

The Russell 2000 index of smaller companies rose 33.61, or 8.4 percent, to 433.72.

The Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 index, which reflects nearly all stocks traded in America, jumped 7 percent. That's a paper gain of about $700 billion.

More than 10 stocks rose for every one that fell on the New York Stock Exchange, where consolidated volume came to nearly 7.5 billion shares, about even with Friday's pace.

The Dow is now up 1,228 points, or 18.8 percent, from March 9, when it finished at its lowest point in nearly 12 years, although it's still down 1,000 points in 2009. The S&P 500 is up 21.6 percent in that time.

The Dow and the S&P 500 index remain more than 45 percent below their peak in October 2007.

So what should you make out of this rally? It basically confirms that the big banks were waiting for Treasury Secretary Geithner's plan to shore up their balance sheets. Citigroup (C), Bank of America (BAC), Wells fargo (WFC), JP Morgan (JPM) and Goldman Sachs (GS) were all up big today.

Hedge funds and prop traders who wanted more "juice" were out buying the Direxion Financial Bull 3X Shares (FAS), up a whopping 41% today as the financial orgy gripped Wall Street.

Why shouldn't the Masters of the Universe party? Geithner's new plan needs hedge fund and private equity backing:

President Barack Obama and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner today unveiled an ambitious plan for a public-private partnership to buy up the toxic assets that have caused bank lending to grind to a halt. But the hedge funds and private equity firms needed to make the Public Private Investment Program work are expressing misgivings amidst Congressional action to restrict bonuses at companies receiving bailout money.

Geithner's plan would use up to $100 billion in bailout money to back private investors that buy some of the hundreds of billions of dollars of illiquid assets and loans that have thus far proven resistant to a solution.

"Our judgment is that the best way to get through this is if we can work with the markets," Geithner told The Wall Street Journal. "We don't want the government to assume all the risk. We want the private sector to work with us."

Some alternative investment executives were briefed on Geithner's plan yesterday. They expressed their concern, not about PIPP, but about the American International Group bonus outcry, and legislation that would tax at a 90% rate any bonuses handed out by firms receiving more than $5 billion in government bailout money.

According to The New York Times, those executives said they would only participate in PIPP if Treasury sets no compensation limits. The Journal says Geithner agrees that they should not be subject to the terms of the AIG legislation, should it pass the Senate and receive the president's assent.

Now that they are not subject to compensation limits, they can focus on scamming the TALF:

Today's new public-private partnership bailout scheme is very similar to the TALF, the Fed program that will let hedge funds lever up their purchases of distressed assets. It's the same deal: The banks get to dump "toxic" assets, the hedge funds set a price, and taxpayers get their money back if anyone makes a profit.

But it looks like the TALF could easily be scammed, resulting in huge losses for the taxpayer.

Zero Hedge explains the process.

  1. First the hedge fund buys an asset with a face value of $100 for $80. The hedge fund puts up $2.40, while the Fed contributes the rest, $77.60. Huge leverage.
  2. The next day, the hedge fund re-runs the model and realizes that they overpaid the bank. Turns out, it was only worth $20 -- which was where the market had been, sans-government leverage.
  3. The hedge fund loses it entire $2.40, and the taxpayer loses its entire $77.60.
  4. BUT! The bank buys the asset back from the hedge fund at $20, while paying it a $5 million fee for its trouble.
  5. The upshot: The banks sells high, buys low. The hedge fund collects a fee for holding the asset. And the taxpayer is screwed.

Good deal, eh!?

It's a great deal for everyone but the chumps footing the bill. And some very smart people are not convinced this plan will succeed.

Nobel-prize winning economist Paul Krugman said in remarks published on Monday that the latest U.S. Treasury bailout program is nearly certain to fail, triggering a sense of personal despair:

U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on Monday unveiled a plan aimed at persuading private investors to help rid banks up to $1 trillion in toxic assets that that are seen as a roadblock to economic recovery.

"This is more than disappointing," Krugman wrote in The New York Times. ""In fact it fills me with a sense of despair."

"The Geithner scheme would offer a one-way bet: if asset values go up, the investors profit, but if they go down, the investors can walk away from their debt," the Princeton University economist said, citing weekend reports outlining the plan.

"This isn't really about letting markets work. It's just an indirect, disguised way to subsidize purchases of bad assets," he added.

Krugman called it a recycled idea of former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, who later abandoned the "cash for trash" proposal.

"But the real problem with this plan is that it won't work," he says, adding that bad loans may be undervalued because there is too much fear in the current climate.

"But the fact is that financial executives literally bet their banks on the belief that there was no housing bubble, and the related belief that unprecedented levels of household debt were no problem. They lost that bet. And no amount of financial hocus-pocus -- for that is what the Geithner plan amounts to -- will change that fact," Krugman wrote.

While the real economy is being hurt by the meltdown of the financial system itself, Krugman says this is not the first or the last time this has happened. And there are lots of roadmaps to get us out.

"It goes like this: the government secures confidence in the system by guaranteeing many (though not necessarily all) bank debts. At the same time, it takes temporary control of truly insolvent banks, in order to clean up their books," Krugman said.

Time is running out on the Obama administration to take control of the banks - and the crisis.

"If this plan fails - as it almost surely will - it's unlikely that he'll be able to persuade Congress to come up with more funds to do what he should have done in the first place," he wrote.

The White House strongly disagreed with Krugman's assessment, defending the administration plans on the morning talk shows.

"I think Paul's just wrong on this one," Christina Romer, head of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, said on ABC's "Good Morning America" show just ahead of the plan's release.

"This is really tails both the government and the private sector win, heads both the government and the private sector lose. We both are going to have, as the saying goes, skin in the game."

Those same thoughts were expressed by James Galbraith who called Geither's plan "extremely dangerous":

In short, because the plan is yet another massive, ineffective gift to banks and Wall Street. Taxpayers, of course, will take the hit Why does Tim Geithner keep repackaging the same trash-asset-removal plan that he has been trying to get approved since last fall?

In our opinion, because Tim Geithner formed his view of this crisis last fall, while sitting across the table from his constituents at the New York Fed: The CEOs of the big Wall Street firms. He views the crisis the same way Wall Street does--as a temporary liquidity problem--and his plans to fix it are designed with the best interests of Wall Street in mind.

If Geithner's plan to fix the banks would also fix the economy, this would be tolerable. But no smart economist we know of thinks that it will.

We think Geithner is suffering from five fundamental misconceptions about what is wrong with the economy. Here they are:

The trouble with the economy is that the banks aren't lending. The reality: The economy is in trouble because American consumers and businesses took on way too much debt and are now collapsing under the weight of it. As consumers retrench, companies that sell to them are retrenching, thus exacerbating the problem. The banks, meanwhile, are lending. They just aren't lending as much as they used to. Also the shadow banking system (securitization markets), which actually provided more funding to the economy than the banks, has collapsed.

The banks aren't lending because their balance sheets are loaded with "bad assets" that the market has temporarily mispriced. The reality: The banks aren't lending (much) because they have decided to stop making loans to people and companies who can't pay them back. And because the banks are scared that future writedowns on their old loans will lead to future losses that will wipe out their equity.

Bad assets are "bad" because the market doesn't understand how much they are really worth. The reality: The bad assets are bad because they are worth less than the banks say they are. House prices have dropped by nearly 30% nationwide. That has created something in the neighborhood of $5+ trillion of losses in residential real estate alone (off a peak market value of housing about $20+ trillion). The banks don't want to take their share of those losses because doing so will wipe them out. So they, and Geithner, are doing everything they can to pawn the losses off on the taxpayer.

Once we get the "bad assets" off bank balance sheets, the banks will start lending again. The reality: The banks will remain cautious about lending, because the housing market and economy are still deteriorating. So they'll sit there and say they are lending while waiting for the economy to bottom.

Once the banks start lending, the economy will recover. The reality: American consumers still have debt coming out of their ears, and they'll be working it off for years. House prices are still falling. Retirement savings have been crushed. Americans need to increase their savings rate from today's 5% (a vast improvement from the 0% rate of two years ago) to the 10% long-term average. Consumers don't have room to take on more debt, even if the banks are willing to give it to them.

Importantly, Galbraith thinks the plan is flawed because it does not deal with the collateral of the borrowers. "Banks will sit there and they will not come back and start a new credit expansion".

"Furthermore, the structural problem of banking system will remain which is that the financial system as a whole is much too large relative to the economy, so the shrinking of the financial system which has to occur to restore its health will not have occured."

For those who think there is no alternative to the public-private investment fund, professor Galbraith says that is "hogwash":

Aside from being legally proscribed, the upside of FDIC receivership is the banks are restructured and reorganized for potential sale (either in whole or parts), Galbraith says. Such was the fate in 2008 of, most notably, Washington Mutual and IndyMac.

Crucially, FDIC receivership also means new management teams for insolvent banks; and Galbraith notes new leaders will have no incentive to cover up the fraudulent or predatory lending practices of their predecessors. Given the entire system was "massively corrupted by the subprime debacle," the professor believes criminal prosecutions on par with the aftermath of the S&L crisis - when hundreds of insiders went to jail - is a likely (and necessary) outcome of the current crisis.

But don't expect to see many "perp walks" if Geithner's current plan comes to fruition. That's one reason Galbraith called the plan "extremely dangerous" in part one of our interview.

So why isn't the Obama administration pushing for FDIC receivership? "Political influence of big banks," the economist says.

One person who enthusiastically supports the new public-private plan is Bill Gross of PIMCO. Mr. Gross was on the Nightly Business Report on Monday calling it a "win- win-win" and stating that the plan will allow buyers and sellers of toxic assets to meet find common pricing levels:

GHARIB: Another prickly area is pricing. The banks are going to want to sell these assets as, at as high a price as possible and the private investors are going to want to buy them at a low a price as possible. So there is a big gap. Could that pricing issue derail the plan?

GROSS: I think it's still a problem. We're just going to have to find out, probably in 30 to 60 days when all of this comes together. I mean the banks up until this point for a typical loan have wanted $0.70 or higher, the private market in terms of buyers have wanted $0.40 or lower and that a huge gap. What this financing does though, this leverage, this availability of money at 1 to 1 1/2 percent financing, in other words, the ability to borrow money at a cheap rate, what that does is make it possible for the 40 percent price to move up to $0.60 or $0.65 and still be on a comparable basis. So buyers and sellers have moved much closer together based upon this particular plan.

GHARIB: All right so if the buyers and sellers finally can work something out, how soon do you think that this could get the credit flowing in the economy?

GROSS: Well, it will take some time. You know, I mentioned it will take 30 to 60 days to implement or to begin to implement this particular plan. And then once the toxic waste so to speak is cleared off the balance sheets if it is, then you know, the new lending will begin and that will take six to 12 months. So this not a situation by any means where the U.S. economy or the global economy is out of the woods. We expect further deterioration in terms of unemployment, further deterioration in terms of economic growth but this is a major step to cushion that process.

GHARIB: But today President Obama was saying that he sees glimmers of hope in the economy and last week we also got some very optimistic comments from Fed chief Ben Bernanke. Are you beginning to see a turn at all in the economy?

GROSS: Not yet. You know, I think that's still six to 12 months out and I think ultimately Susie that when the economy does turn, that those that are expecting it to turn and to move back up to normal levels, to levels of growth of 3 to 4 percent, unemployment rates back to 4 1/2 to 5 percent, that they are sadly mistaken. We are moving to what we call a new normal which reflects a very subdued level of economic growth and a very subdued rate basically of growth for economic assets and financial assets.

GHARIB: Just have a little time left and I hate to leave it on a down note. But worst-case scenario, what if this Treasury plan doesn't work? What does that mean for the economy and for reviving the financial system?

GROSS: Well, if it doesn't work, it means that the basically the $5 trillion hole that Pimco estimates that the U.S. economy has to fill back in, that the Fed, the Treasury, that the fiscal stimulation plan in terms of the budget deficit has to fill in, it means that that would be a tremendous, tremendous effort going forward. Basically this program has to work.

Late tonight, Charlie Rose invited Andrew Ross Sorkin, Joe Nocera and Paul Krugman to discuss the public-private plan (click here to view this interview but it might not be available until tomorrow on the website).

Joe Nocera stated that you can't use the stock market as a barometer of the financial system's health because it too volatile. He said the credit markets hardly flinched on Monday (read this Bloomberg article on bank bond spreads). He was also concerned about the populist backlash, saying it could be profoundly "destabilizing".

Andrew Ross Sorkin mentioned his New York Times article, If Goldman Returns Aid, Will Others?, where he states that Goldman is planning to give back its TARP money soon. On Charlie Rose, he agreed with Joe Nocera's concerns about the populist backlash because it could engender a "domino effect" where weaker banks also want to return TARP funds.

I quote from the article:

It remains possible that Treasury could try to persuade Goldman to hold off on paying the money back until the economy stabilizes. That could stir up a new flavor of public outrage.

For his part, Krugman once again made the most sense, stating that the plan is ensuring another Japanese-style lost decade of "zombie banks". He went over the Geithner plan arithmetic and he said that it's basically trying to "bribe" private funds into buying these assets using government subsidies.

Krugman thinks we need to adopt the Swedish model and bring back the Resolution Trust solution that was used to work through the S&L crisis. He said that he finds it ironic when people say "we are not like the Japanese because we moved faster". In his eyes, we are only prolonging the agony. I couldn't agree more.

Finally, I leave you with this Harper's Magazine article by Ken Silverstein, Hedge Fund Socialism:

There's already much debate about the merits of the administration's plan to clean up toxic assets, but one person I spoke with—a well-connected Democrat representing a big investment firm — was absolutely crystal-eyed about the fundamentals:

Even as details are being worked out, he saw ample opportunities for his firm to make huge profits. Banks, hedge funds and other investors that take part in the plan cannot lose money, thanks to the government's support and guarantees. Taxpayers, he said with a mix of regret and satisfaction, were getting shafted again.

Paul Krugman has it just right:

For the private investors, this is an open invitation to play heads I win, tails the taxpayers lose. So sure, these investors will be ready to pay high prices for toxic waste. After all, the stuff might be worth something; and if it isn't, that's someone else's problem.

Incidentally, try to imagine if the Bush Administration had floated this plan. Is there anyone from the liberal blogosphere who wouldn't be denouncing this as a Wall Street giveaway? Particularly given the architects of the Obama administration's plan? As Frank Rich wrote:

"Given that Summers worked for a secretive hedge fund, D. E. Shaw, after he was pushed out of Harvard's presidency at the bubble's height, you have to wonder how he can now sell the administration's plan for buying up toxic assets with the help of hedge funds. It will look like another giveaway to his own insiders' club. As for Geithner, people might take him more seriously if he gave a credible account of why, while at the New York Fed, he and the Goldman alumnus Hank Paulson let Lehman Brothers fail but saved the Goldman-trading ally A.I.G.

I want you to think about something else. Who funds hedge funds and private equity funds? Pension funds, insurance companies, endowment funds, and some banks.

I find it perverse that pension funds will pay 2% management fee and 20% performance fee to some hedge fund or P.E. fund that will then get a government subsidy to buy these assets at 30 or 40 cents on the dollar hoping to sell them to a greater fool at a higher price.

I got a better idea (call it the 'Kolivakis Pension Plan'). Why don't the world's largest pension funds band together to create a "Pension Resolution Trust" taking these assets off the banks' books and then selling them off slowly over many years as the global economy eventually recovers?

Why pay fees to hedge funds, private equity funds or the PIMCOs of this world when you can band together and use your financial clout and deep pockets to make money by directly taking ownership of these assets?

Admittedly, this will require some serious planning, some changes in individual investment policies and some resources to make it work, but it can also help pensions deal with their deficits while they help the credit system get going again.

I think it's time we start thinking "outside the box" and start implementing some long-term solutions to deal with a virulent financial crisis that threatens global peace and prosperity.


 
 

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jeudi 19 mars 2009

If Financial Reporters Knew Arithmetic, Then They Should Have Seen This Cris...

just for fun

 
 

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via Beat the Press le 17/03/09

Richard Cohen is continuing the stream of excuses for the financial media's failure to warn of the economic crisis. At the center of the cover-up for the media's incompetence is an effort to imply that the issues involved were very complex.

As Cohen puts it:

"There was not much they [financial reporters] could do, anyway. They do not have subpoena power. They cannot barge into AIG and demand to see the books, and even if they could, they would not have known what they were looking at. The financial instruments that Wall Street firms were both peddling and buying are the functional equivalent of particle physics. To this day, no one knows their true worth."

This is pathetic. Financial reporters did not need subpoena power, they did not need access to AIG's books, they did not even need to know what a credit default swap was. They just needed to know arithmetic.

The basic story is as simple as you can possible have. Nationwide house prices tracked inflation for 100 years from 1895 to 1995. In the decade from 1996 to 2006, they rose by more than 70 percent after adjusting for inflation, creating more than $8 trillion in housing bubble wealth.

There was no remotely plausible explanation for this increase in house prices on either the supply-side or the demand side. If there is a huge divergence from a 100-year long trend, with no explanation based on fundamentals, how could it be anything over than a bubble?

And, who could have thought that the country could lose $8 trillion in housing wealth ($110,000 for every homeowner) without enormous consequences for the economy?

Financial reporters did not need to do investigation (although exposing the corruption in the financial industry that supported the growth in the bubble-- which some reporters did-- would have been a great public service), they just needed to know arithmetic and have some commonsense.

For example, relying on David Lereah, the chief economist of the National Association of Realtors, as the main source for expertise on the housing market was not clever. Nor was it clever to rely on industry backed housing centers as a major source for news reports.

Also, running an occasional piece talking to Nouriel Roubini or one of the other bubble warners doesn't cut it. The bubble was by far the biggest thing out there. It should have been in the news every single day.

The financial reporters blew it, bigtime. They should start by acknowledging this failure and then figure out how to avoid blowing it again in the future.

Yes, economists were far worse -- how about a good news story explaining that even though nearly all economists completely failed to see the coming of the biggest economic disaster in their lifetime, none of them will suffer any consequences in their career? None will get fired and almost none of them will even miss a promotion. Reporting on the non-accountability of economists would be a very good story for financial reporters.

--Dean Baker


 
 

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mercredi 11 mars 2009

Haircuts for Bond Holders

ENFIN !!!!!!! cette crise ne s'améliorera pas tant que les différentes parties n'auront pas compris que seules des réductions massives de dette peuvent fonctionner. Quant à l'impact sur les détenteurs d'obligations (banques, fonds de pension, FCP)... Les actionnaires ont déjà largement payé (et n'ont probablement pas fini), au tour des investisseurs obligataires.

 
 

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via The Big Picture de Barry Ritholtz le 11/03/09

"The bond market is getting more scared every day. At some time, the government is going to say enough is enough, the only way we will give you more cash is if the bondholders have to be hit."
-Gary Austin, PDR Advisors

>

We have been lambasting the AIG bailout as a backdoor rescue for Goldman and others. It is unconscionable that the taxpayer must make good the speculative, off-exchange bets made by hedge funds.

There is another group that has also been (unfairly) made whole: The Bond Holders.They lent momey to poorly run, insolvent institutions, and somehow expect to see a return of a 100% of their capital.That makes no sense whatsoever.

In bailout deals such as Bear Stearns, Citgroup and Bank of America, they garnered a 100% return of invested capital (i.e., lonas). I suspect that is fast coming to an end. In the event of any pre-packaged receivership workout (aka Nationalization), the bond holders are going to have to take a big hit.

Bloomberg:

"Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp.'s bond prices are sliding on concern that owners of debt issued by U.S. financial firms will be forced to swallow losses if the industry needs another bailout.

U.S. bank debt has lost 7.8 percent and yields have jumped to record levels compared with benchmark rates in the past month, even after taxpayers committed more than $11.6 trillion to prop up financial firms. With shareholders almost wiped out at banks like Citigroup and lawmakers resisting more rescues, holders may be asked to swap bonds for new debt that offers reduced interest rates or lower face values, analysts said.

Debt investors are an attractive target because of the size of their holdings — more than $1 trillion just at the four largest U.S. banks — and because they've emerged almost unscathed so far."

I thought this quote was interesting also:

Since any reduction in debt at a bank helps boost capital ratios, members of Congress including U.S. Representative Brad Sherman, a California Democrat, say it's time for bondholders to share the pain.

"These banks can go into receivership, shed their shareholders, shed or reduce the amount they owe to their bondholders and come back out much stronger institutions," said Sherman, who sits on the House Financial Services Committee, in a statement to Bloomberg News. More U.S. capital might be offered as part of the package, he said.

I appears that Congress is starting to get it . . .

>

Previously:
iBanks Grabbed $50 Billion in AIG Bailout Cash (March 7th, 2009)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/ibanks-grabbed-50-billion-in-aig-bailout-cash/

Backdoor Bailouts for Goldman Sachs? (March 5, 2009)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/backdoor-bailouts-for-goldman-sachs/

Solvent Insurer / Insolvent Insurer (March 4, 2009)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/solvent-insurer-insolvent-insurer/

Source:
Banks' Bondholders May Be Next in Line to Share Bailout Pain
David Mildenberg and Bryan Keogh
Bloomberg, March 11 2009
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601213&sid=agAXIowc8q3c&


 
 

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mardi 10 mars 2009

Willem Buiter Strikes Again, Calls for Over-Regulation of Banks



 
 

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via naked capitalism de Yves Smith le 10/03/09

In case readers haven't figured it out, I am a big Willem Buiter fan. Even when he is wrong, he is at least forthright and colorful. He does have an appetite for showing off his formidable intellect. Nevertheless, his best qualities are his willingness to take on orthodoxies and authorities, and his vivid, trenchant style. It was Buiter who at the last Jackson Hole conference accused the Fed of "cognitive regulatory capture," eliciting a firestorm of criticism.

Today Buiter takes up one of my favorite causes: the need to leash and collar bankers. He dismisses the canard so often trotted out in the US, that too many restraints might inhibit financial innovation. Paul Volcker deemed the most important financial innovation in the last 30 years to be the ATM machine. Nassim Nicolas Taleb has dismissed the supposed advantages conferred by the development of the Black-Scholes option pricing model.

Given the considerable costs gambling innovation hath wrought, the calls to shackle bankers seem completely warranted. If any other class had done this much damage, they'd almost certainly be in jail.

Note the timing of this post. This is pre the G-20, where the Euro crowd is pushing for more financial regulation, particularly with new international mechanisms, while the US is arguing for more coordinated fiscal stimulus. The US does not want to (and won't as long as the dollar holds as reserve currency) cede control over its institutions. But a good deal more "harmonisation" and coordination is in order.

Buiter provides a long list of reform ideas. I've extracted the ones I found most interesting, and I encourage readers to look at the full roster. Be sure to read his comments on self regulation.

From VoxEU:
Financial regulation is a now-or-never proposition as the sector's lobbying power is greatly diminished. This column argues that we should embrace robust regulation now, risking over-regulation. Correcting mistakes later would be better than risking another era of "self-" or "soft-touch" regulation.

Over-regulate now

It is necessary, for political economy reasons, to rush new comprehensive regulation of the financial sector. While it would be better, holding constant the likelihood of the measures being adopted and implemented, not to act in haste, there is now a unique window of opportunity – a period of extraordinary politics, in the words of Balcerowicz – to actually get the thorough regulatory reform we need. The reason is that the private financial sector is on its uppers – down and out – and will not be able to put together much of a fight, let alone its usual boom-time massive lobbying effort to veto radical measures. It is better to over-regulate now and subsequently correct the mistakes than to risk another era of self-regulation and soft-touch under-regulation of financial markets, instruments and institutions.

Macro-prudential regulation

The objective of macro-prudential regulation is systemic financial stability. This has a number of dimensions:
Preventing or mitigating asset market and credit booms, bubbles and busts
Preventing or mitigating market illiquidity in systemically important markets
Preventing or mitigating funding illiquidity for systemically important financial institutions
Preventing or managing insolvencies of systemically important financial institutions

Other micro-prudential considerations (abuse of monopoly power; consumer protection; micro-manifestations of asymmetric information) should be left to the micro-prudential regulator(s).

Comprehensive regulation
Regulation will have to be comprehensive across instruments, institutions, markets and countries. Specifically, we must:
R
egulate all systemically important highly leveraged financial enterprises, whatever they call themselves: commercial bank, investment bank, universal bank, hedge fund, SIV, CDO, private equity fund or bicycle repair shop.
Regulate all markets for systemically important financial instruments.
Regulate all systemically important financial infrastructure or plumbing: payment, clearing, settlement systems, mechanisms and platforms, and the associated provision of custodial services.
Do it all on a cross-border basis.

Self-regulation

Self-regulation is to regulation as self-importance is to importance. The notion that markets, including financial markets could be self-regulating, by properly incentivising CEOs and Boards of Directors and through market-discipline, is prima facie suspect. We decide to regulate markets because of market failure. Then we let the market regulate the market. This is an invisible hand too far. The concept of self-regulation is especially ludicrous for financial markets. Finance is trade in promises expressed in units of abstract purchasing power (money). It scales up and down ferociously quickly. If Airbus or Boeing wishes to double the size of its operations, it takes 4 or 5 years to put in place another set of assembly lines. If a bank wishes to scale its balance sheet and operations ten-fold, all it has to do is to add a zero in the right places. Given enough optimism, trust, confidence and self-confidence, financial activity can, through leverage, be scaled up alarmingly quickly. Once optimism, trust, confidence and self-confidence disappear and are replaced by pessimism, mistrust, lack of confidence and fear/panic, the scaling down of bank activities can occur even faster. Such an industry cannot be left to its own devices.

The importance of public information

Regulation can only take place on the basis of independently verifiable (public) information. Regulators cannot rely on information that is private to the regulated entity. This means that the capital adequacy of the first pillar of Basel II has to be overhauled radically, as its risk-weighting of assets relies in part on internal bank models that are private to the banks...

Regulation financial innovation

Financial innovation in products and institutions is potentially beneficial and potentially harmful. There is a need to regulate financial innovation. I propose the model used in the US by the Food and Drug Administration for pharmaceutical and medical products.
First, there is a positive list of financial instruments and institutions. Anything that is not explicitly allowed is forbidden.
To get a new instrument or new institution approved, there will have to be testing, scrutiny by regulators, supervisors, academic specialists and other interested parties, and pilot projects. It is possible that, once a new instrument or institution has been approved, it is only available 'with a prescription'. For instance, only professional counterparties rather than the general public could be permitted.....

Clearly, this approach to financial innovation would slow down financial innovation. It may even kill off certain innovations that would have been socially useful. So be it. The dangers of unbridled financial innovation are too manifest.

Yves here. The FDA has recently come under a lot of criticism (deservedly) but that is due in large measure to a lack of commitment to its mandate from deregulation-minded Administrations, budget cuts, and its conflicted position (40%+ of its budget comes from fees paid by the industry for new drug applications, an arrangement created during the Bush Senior presidency. Too high a turndown rate would deter applications. The problems with the FDA are due to a significant degree to nearly 20 years of efforts to undermine its role. And that is not my just my view; I've heard this sort of thing from FDA lawyers and former FDA commissioners). Back to Buiter:
Narrow banking vs. investment banking

The distinction between public utility banking/narrow banking vs. investment banking; (the rest) has to be re-introduced. I advocate a form of Glass-Steagall on steroids, with a heavily regulated and closely supervised narrow banking sector, engaged in commercial banking (taking deposits and making loans) and benefiting from lender of last resort and market maker of last resort support. The investment bank sector will also be regulated and supervised, but more lightly, and according to the same principles as other systemically important highly leveraged non-narrow bank institutions.

Universal banking has few if any efficiency advantages and many disadvantages. Economies of scale and scope in banking are soon exhausted. They tend to be fat to fail, have a lack of focus, and suffer from span-of-control negative synergies etc. Universal banks or financial supermarkets use their size to exploit market power and try to shelter their risky, non-narrow banking activities under the LLR and MMLR umbrella of the narrow bank that's hiding somewhere inside the universal bank....

Mixed public-private ownership

Given the manifest failure of the efficient market hypothesis, it is not at all obvious that systemically important financial institutions should be allowed to be listed companies. Financial institutions' stock market valuations have been notorious will-o'-the wisps and have, through stock options and other stock-market valuation-related executive remuneration components, contributed to the excessive risk taking during the recent boom. Partnerships, mutual ownership, cooperative ownership, and various forms of public and mixed public-private ownership may be more appropriate for financial institutions. Perhaps we should even consider removing limited liability for investment banks!

 
 

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lundi 9 mars 2009

Some Musings on The Black Swan



 
 

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via naked capitalism de Yves Smith le 07/03/09

I must confess to being very late to read Nassim Nicolas Taleb's The Black Swan, and frankly had considered NOT reading it. First, it has been so widely reviewed and discussed that I had assumed the additional knowledge to be gained by reading the book itself would be marginal. Second, I've read a bit of Benoit Mandelbrot, who is arguably Taleb's most important predecessor. It was Mandelbrot, a mathematician, in the 1960s, who found 100 years of cotton trading data, with daily prices. Mandelbrot cut the information every which way and found that its distribution did not at all correspond with the assumptions underpinning the new and growing school of financial economics. It was Mandelbrot that discovered "fat tails", that very extreme price movements are far more likely than the theories predict. He also found that market have memory, that their price movements do not comport with the "random walk" theory (I have assumed this pattern somehow relates to the cognitive bias of anchoring, but do not know if anyone has been able to connect the dots).

His findings were initially rejected, and continued to be resisted even when they were replicated in other markets (and then proved out in the real world: a daily price move like that of the 1987 crash was so extreme as to verge on being statistically impossible).

Put simply, computational convenience trumped empirical findings.

Even though Taleb's observations have gotten a lot of attention in the popular media, I sincerely doubt they will be internalized. In classic cognitive dissonance fashion, his views may be given more lip service, but it will not be integrated into mental models, even of those who ought to pay heed. The very fact that his construct has been reduced to the soundbite "black swan" when it is more complicated and richer is telling.

What are some of the reasons? Let me speculate.

First, Taleb goes to some length to establish that he is not the first to go down this line of thinking; he has quite a few intellectual ancestors. Yet these observations never took hold.

Of course, one reason is that the implications are pretty uncomfortable for a lot of professions (although Taleb would dispute their clams of professionalism). He contends that predictions are a fraught-to-useless exercise, and cites research that shows that lay forecasts are frequently no worse than those of experts. His book would appeal most to people who are well educated and interested in finance and economics. A fairly large subset of that group has invested in expensive educations and/or developed a lot of career experience to try to anticipate the future better than your average slob. Do you think a book, even a very persuasive book, is going to change how people operate on a day-to-day basis? Unlikely.

But second, and perhaps as important, people do not want to see the world as subject to chance to the degree that Taleb says it is. This is hugely unsettling if you really do come to terms with the implications of his argument. We like to believe we have some measure of control over our lives. And research has shown that people do pretty consistently overestimate their degree of control and influence (for instance, most people will exaggerate their contribution to the success of a project, not as a matter of PR, although that may be true too, but their private assessment). Most people (ironically those deemed psychologically healthy) have an optimistic bias and generally assign too high odds of things working out well (the mildly depressed make more accurate assessments. I have often wondered which way the causality runs: do they make better assessments BECAUSE their unhappy state strips away the rose-colored filter, or are they mildly depressed because they keep giving more realistic assessments, which makes them a drag to be around, and they are depressed because they encounter social rejection?). So if you embrace Taleb, you'd have to accept the disorienting fact that the world really is a pretty untractable place, that success had more to do with luck than application (although Taleb stresses the importance of working at being lucky, that is, accepting the opportunity to meet new people and make the most of chance encounters).

Third, if our mental construct of how the world works is off in some fundamental respects, it also calls into question our ability to make good decisions. And apart from Taleb, there are reasons to question our abilities here. It has been pretty well documented in brain research that humans can only hold so many variables in their consciousness at once. Our decision-making capabilities are more limited than we'd like to believe. And confronting every situation as if it were new would be simply exhausting, That is why we rely heavily on rules of thumb (more fancily called heuristics). Now we also have certain types of analytic processes, what I like to think of as pattern recognition, that can serve us well (this was the topic of Malcolm Gladwell's Blink). The problem is that this quick pattern recognition can work very well, or be absolutely wrong, and we have no easy way of telling which.

Essentially, Taleb paints a picture of the world and human behavior that is unflattering. So as much as his work makes a fundamentally important set of observations, its success may be largely a function of luck. It came out just when the credit markets were starting to unravel and well established practices, both among traders and the broader financial community, were being shown to have serious flaws. Had his book come out at another juncture, it probably would not have been as well received.

 
 

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